Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1977

Verna R. Smith v. Albert Coon and 20th Century
Housing : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Verna R. Smith; Pro Se for Appellant.
Pamela R. Taggart; Roe and Fowler; Attorneys for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Smith v. Coon, No. 197714519.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/422

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KFU
45.9
•S9
DOCKET NO.

BRIEF

A&9/C
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE [STATE OF UTAH

VERNA R, SMITH,
P] .ii.nl i I f -AppulKml ,
Case No.

vs.

14519

ALBERT COON and 20th CENTURY
HOUSING, a Nevada corporatioi: 1,
Defendants-Re spondei i I:

KESl'OND

il

fror
V CI

RIEf

"udgment o t t i i e
Salt Lake County
H. Croft J u d q e

Pam^ la R. Taggart
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
SaLit Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondent
Verna R. Smith
906 South 19 th East
Salt Lake Ci ty, Utah 8
Pro se for Plaintiff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT:
I. The Alleged Incapacity of Appellant's
Counsel is Not a Proper Ground for
Appeal
II. The Judgment of the Trial Court is Supported by the Evidence
III. The Case Herein Should be Remanded to
the Trial Court for the Sole Purpose
of Determining Additional Attorney' s
Fees to Which Respondent is Entitled
CONCLUSION

Page
1
1
2
2

6
11

14
14

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Airkem Intermountainy Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65,
513 P.2d 429 (1973)
8,10
Begnall v. Suburbia Land Company, 542 P.2d 183 (Utah
1975)
13
Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277 (1952)
12
In Re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 P.2d
372 (1952)
12
Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962)..7
U.S. Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Midvale Home
Finance Corp. , 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090 (1935).13
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 2d 416, 260 P.2d
741 (1953)
7, 8, 10
AUTHORITIES CITED
4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and
4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and
5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and
68 Am.Jur.2d New Trial
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules
Rule 72, Utah Rules of

Error §487
Error §491
Error §897
§160
of Civil Procedure
Civil Procedure

7, 12
13
8
10
7,8,10,11
7

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
VERNA R. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14519

ALBERT COON and TWENTIETH CENTURY
HOUSING, a Nevada corporation,
Defendants-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff-appellant sought judgment for breach of a
Uniform Real Estate Contract, possession of the subject real
property, treble damages, attorney's fees and costs.

Defen-

dant-respondent, Twentieth Century Housing (hereinafter refei
red to as TCH) counterclaimed for an order requiring plaintif
appellant to accept defendant-respondent's payments and to
submit an accounting of all sums received pursuant to the
Uniform Real Estate Contract, damages for abuse of process,
attorney's fees and costs.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court rendered judgment on the parties' cross
motions for summary judgment as follows:

1.

Defendant TCH's motion for partial summary judgment

was granted.
2.

Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment was

denied.
3.

Plaintiff wrongfully refused defendant Twentieth

Century Housing's tender of payments.
4.

There was no default by defendants on the Uniform

Real Estate Contract.
5.

The assignment of contract between the defendants

was valid.
6.

Plaintiff was awarded $30.55 as reimbursement for

unpaid net taxes.
7.

Defendant Twentieth Century Housing was awarded $1,000

as attorney's fees, to be offset against the unpaid net taxes
and the accumulated payments which total $1,350.55 owing
plaintiff for the period of April, 1974, through January, 1976.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment and remand
to the lower court solely for the purpose of determining additional attorney's fees to which respondent is entitled.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's recitation
of the facts includes statements not included in the pleadings
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nor evidence presented to the lower court herein, and not at
issue nor relevant in those proceedings.

Also, appellant

fails to include facts necessary to accurately reflect the
status and nature of this action*

Although no record on

appeal has been filed herein, respondent, submits the following as an accurate and complete statement of the facts
herein for the court?s examination.
On or about February 2, 1965, defendant Albert Coon and
appellant executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract whereby
defendant Albert Coon agreed to purchase and appellant agreed
to sell certain real property located in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

The contract recited a purchase price of

$10,500.00, with a downpayment of $500.00.

The balance of

$10,000.00 was to be paid in monthly installments of $60.00
with interest at the rate of 6 1/2 percent per annum.

The

remainder of the contract contained the standard provisions,
including the requirement that the buyer assume responsibilit
for payment of real property taxes and insurance.

On or aboi

February 20, 1974, defendant-respondent TCH and defendant All
Coon and his wife, Oleita S. Coon, executed

an Assignment

of

Contract, whereby respondent assumed all rights and obligatic
under the aforesaid Uniform Real Estate Contract with appell<
Said assignment of contract recited that the balance due und<
the Uniform Real Estate Contract as of March 5, 1974, was
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$9,391.04.

Respondent notified appellant of the assignment

by letter dated March 11, 19 74.

Respondent commenced tender

of payment of the $60.00 per month as required by the Uniform
Real Estate Contract to appellant.

Appellant refused to

accept any of said payments, asserting that the balance
recited on the assignment was incorrect,, the payments were
not legal tender, and various other reasons.

Respondent

offered to make payments in any medium desired by appellant
and requested an accounting of sums received and those due
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Appellant failed to

specify a medium of payment acceptable to h e r and also
failed to provide the accounting requested by respondent.

A

notice of delinquency was served on both defendants and
thereafter, a notice of tenancy at will.

Appellant there-

after filed a complaint alleging breach of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract because of failure to make the required
monthly payments, and sought, as a remedy, repossession of the
subject real property, treble damages, attorney ! s fees and costs.
Respondent answered and counterclaimed, denying a breach of contract on the basis that it had tendered all required payments
and that said payments had been wrongfully refused by appellant.
Respondent also sought an accounting of sums paid and owing on
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, damages for abuse of process,
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attorney's fees and costs.

Subsequent to the filing of the

complaint herein, defendant Albert Coon, died.

Appellant move

to substitute a party for defendant Coon, and petitioned for
letters of administration.

The lower court denied said motioi

and petition on the grounds that defendant Coon had left no
estate, the assignment between the defendants was valid, and
defendant Coon therefore had no interest in the Uniform Real
Estate Contract subject to probate.
After extensive discovery by the remaining parties, respondent moved the court for partial summary judgment, seekin
dismissal of appellant's complaint and judgment on its counte
claim, excepting the claim of abuse of process-

Appellant ma

a cross motion for summary judgment on her complaint.

A hear

ing was held in the lower court to consider the motions alone
with the affidavits and memoranda submitted, and arguments oi
counsel.

The hearing was continued for a determination of

the balance due on the contract and any deficiencies thereon
after each party submitted accountings, cancelled checks,
receipts, amortization schedules and affidavits relating
thereto.

As a result of the continued hearing, Judge Croft

awarded the plaintiff the sum of $30.55 to reconcile the
balance due on the Uniform Real Estate Contract with that re
cited in the Assignment of Contract between the defendants •
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ARGUMENT
I
THE ALLEGED INCAPACITY OF APPELLANT'S COUNSEL IS
NOT A PROPER GROUND FOR APPEAL.
Appellant has raised the issue of the incapacity of her
counsel in the trial court proceedings «, However, the issue
of whether or not the health of appellant's counsel prevented
her from being adequately represented in the lower court is
one which requires an evidentiary hearing on matters which
have not and cannot be adequately presented to this court.
The statements in appellant's brief are in the nature of unverified hearsay with little or no probative value.

Respondent1

counsel was surprised to read that appellant's counsel suffered
a heart attack while in court and that the lower court
"abruptly concluded the proceedings and took the matter
under advisement. . . . "

(Appellant's Brief, Page 8).

In

actuality, the lower court heard all arguments to their
conclusion and appellant's counsel suffered no visible
infirmity at that time.

However, respondent realizes that

such statements, without verification, are as useless and
self-serving as those made by appellant and will not respond
in like kind to appellant's assertions.
The appropriate means for seeking relief under the
circumstances described by appellant would have been to
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petition the lower court for relief under one of the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
As stated by this court, relief under Rule 60(b)
is a creature of equity designed to relieve against
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may occur
through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense. Warren v* Dixon
Ranch Company, 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953).
Appellant's contention that her counsel "was physically
incapacitated and was not capable of properly representing
me" (Appellant's Brief, Page 8), falls most clearly under
the parameters of Rule 60(b) rather than as a grounds for
appeal.

Matters on appeal are limited to questions of law ir

law cases, or questions of law and fact in equity cases.
72, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Ru]

Appellate review is fur-

ther limited to the record on appeal and cannot include "matters dehors the records, such as statements or affidavits of
counsel, certificates or statements of the clerk, or statements of the trial judge."

4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 4

Rule 60(b) is applicable to those situations where
"justice has been so thwarted that equity and good conscienc
demand that this extraordinary relief be granted."

Kettner

v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 328, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (1962).
Furthermore, such a motion is clearly within the exclusive province of the trial court, where evidence can be re-
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ceived and a factual determination made as to the competency
of appellant's legal counsel, and, equally important, whether
or not the lack of competency, if established,, prevented appellant from presenting her case to the lower court.

In

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company, supra, the court stated:
The rule that the courts will incline towards granting
relief to a party who has not had opportunity to present his case is ordinarily applied at the trial court
level, . . . 260 P.2d at 744.
That this is a matter to be raised with the trial court
under Rule 60 (b) was reiterated by this court in Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973) .
The rule that the courts will incline towards granting
relief to a party, who has not had the opportunity to
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial
court level, and this court will not reverse the determination of the trial court merely because the motion
could have been granted. 513 P. 2d at 4 3 1 .
This is the rule not only in Utah, but also the majority
view throughout the country:
Whether there should be a new trial for misconduct of
counsel is left almost entirely to the discretion of
the trial court, whose action in this respect will not
be reversed on appeal except for clear abuse of discretion. 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error §89 7.
Therefore, the issue of the competency and effectiveness
of appellant f s counsel ought to have been raised in the trial
court under Rule 60(b).

The decision of the lower court could

then be appealed to this court for a determination of whether
or not the trial court had abused its discretion in ruling,
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based on the record presented therein-

This court, at this

time, has no record upon which to make such a determination*
In the event that the court hesitates to deprive appella
of a rehearing as requested by her, for fear that her content
of lack of adequate representation may be well-founded and th
the time has passed when she could have petitioned the lower
court for a rehearing or other appropriate relief, respondent
respectfully submits the following for the court's considerat
First, the following would be presented by respondent ir
opposition to appellant's contentions: Appellant was apparer
ly aware of her counsel's health problems from at least the
time of the assignment of contract between the defendants
(Appellant's Brief, Page 7); at no time, to the best of
respondent's knowledge, did appellant attempt to substitute
counsel; appellant signed various affidavits during the
course of litigation and presumably knew the contents of
both those and other documents presented to the court; appellant was present at both hearings held in this matter;
and, appellant made no attempt to raise the issue of effective legal counsel until the filing of her brief herein.
Second, legal authorities and precedent in this area
tend to indicate that appellant would not have been successful even had she brought a timely motion before the lower
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court under Rule 60(b).

As stated in 68 Am.Jur.2d New Trial

§160,
Frequently a new trial is sought on the ground of the
alleged incompetency or negligence of the applicant's
attorney, or upon the ground that the attorney was
incapacitated by illness or by intoxication. In civil
cases the rule is practically universal that a new
trial will not be granted on the ground of the negligence
or incompetence of the attorney for the party applying
for such new trial. The law regards the neglect of an
attorney as the client's own neglect and will give no
relief from the consequences thereofUtah law has followed the same rule, that improper or
inadequate actions on the part of the moving party's representative do not usually merit equitable relief under Rule 60(b).
Justice McDonough stated the following in Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Company, supra:
• . . although a judgment may be erroneous and inequitable,
equitable relief will not be granted to a party thereto
on the sole ground that the negligence of the attorney,
agent, trustee or other representative of the present complainant prevented a fair trial. „ . . The requirements
of public policy demand more than a mere statement that
a person did not have his day in court when full
opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him or
his legal representative. 260 P.2d at 743, 744.
In Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra, a much
more egregious situation than that herein was presented
where defense counsel filed a notice of withdrawal on the
day of trial, which withdrawal was refused by the trial
court.

When neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared

at trial a default judgment was entered against the defendant.

Defendant's motion for relief from a final judgment

-10-

under Rule 60 (b) was denied by the trial court and affirmed
on appeal.

The court said:

For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower
court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment, the requirements of public policy demand more than a mere
statement that a person did not have his day in court
when full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded
to him or his legal representative- The movement must
show that he has used due diligence and that he was
presented from appearing by circumstances over which
he had no control. 513 P.2d at 431.
Appellant herein had her day in court with counsel and
the issues were decided upon not only oral argument, but also
a voluminous record.

Respondent contends that appellant woul

have difficulty establishing that she had "no control" over
the situation and used
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due diligence".
II

THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
Appellant has argued that the judgment of the lower cour
was not supported by the evidence.

In support of the same st

recites alleged facts which are supposedly in conflict with
the judgment.

Also included are several statements to the

effect that the purpose of the lawsuit was to clarify the te3
of the contract and determine the correct balance due (Appellant's Brief, Pages 10 and 13).

Since the sole allegation o

default on the contract in the complaint of appellant was
a failure to make required monthly paymentsr issues of
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interpretation of the contract did not arise.

The balance

on the contract was determined by the lower court pursuant
to respondent's counterclaim and submission of the issue by
both parties.
However, most significantly, appellant has failed to
refer to the record herein to support either her factual or
legal arguments.

A fundamental rule of appellate review is

that the party prevailing in the lower court is entitled to
have the evidence reviewed in a light most favorable to him.
As stated in Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277 (1952),
"if there is any competent evidence in the record to support
the court's findings the judgment must be affirmed."

In order

to overcome this presumption the appellants
must detail, with citation to the record where appropriate,
the particulars wherein the evidence touching the findings
is inconsistent therewith or is not of enough moment to
sustain it. In Re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248
P.2d 372 (1952).
The appellate court herein is limited solely to the record
on appeal as a source of evidence and cannot consider extraneous matters, such as unsupported statements contained in
briefs, or references to materials not before the court (See
Appellant's Brief, Page 15, wherein she refers to attorneyfs
bills, receipts and letters).

See 4 AnuJur.2d Appeal and

Error § 487.
The record on appeal was not filed nor designated by
appellant.

Therefore, the decision herein must be based

-12-

solely on the judgment roll and the decision of the lower
court affirmed.

See, U.S. Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Mid-

vale Home Finance Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090, 1092
(1935)•
The rights of the parties to an appellate proceeding
must be determined on the record before the appellate
court. The appellate court is not required to and
may not pass on questions not presented by the record,
although decided by the trial court. 4 Am.Jur.2d
Appeal and Error § 491.
Affirmance of the trial court's judgment in situations
such as that herein was strongly propounded by Justice Henriod in the recent case of Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Company,,
542 P.2d 183 (Utah 1975)-

In Bagnall the defendants desig-

nated only parts of the record favorable to them and made
few references to the record to substantiate their factual
statements*

Plaintiffs also failed to designate the record.

Justice Henriod's majority opinion statesr
As a result we have before us briefs of both sides
loaded with unreferenced, self-serving statements of
facts and contentions, with an apparent invitation that
we perform their procedural obligation and conduct
their research. We cannot indulge them such luxury
under the circumstances here. This court, therefore,
under elementary principles anent appellate review,
in this particular case will presume the findings of
the court to have been supported by adirtissable, compete
substantial evidence—to any criticisms of which, by
any litigants this court feels constrained to turn a
deaf ear. 542 P.2d at 184.
Respondent has attempted to avoid duplicating ttte sxtua
tion described in Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Company, by not
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responding to appellant's arguments with its own statements
equally unsupported by any record before the court.

The law

is clear as to the result mandated herein—affirmance of the
trial court.
Ill
THE CASE HEREIN SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL
COURT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEYS FEES TO WHICH RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED.
The subject matter of this lawsuit is a Uniform Real Estate
Contract which provides for attorney's fees for the prevailing
party, incurred for the enforcement of the contract.

Attorney's

fees were awarded to respondent in the lower court and any
additional fees should be ascertained and awarded for fees
incurred in the prosecution of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's contention that the ill-health of her legal
counsel denied her effective representation in the lower court
is not properly brought before this court prior to a determination of the issue by the lower court pursuant to motion
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This court lacks any record or evidence propejrly before it,
sufficient to enable it to make a decision in relation
thereto, and is indeed precluded by law from doing so.
Because of appellant's failure to refer to the record on
appeal in her argument of insufficient evidence, or even to
designate the record on appeal, this court must presume that
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the judgment of the lower court was supported by sufficient
and reliable evidence and, therefore, affirm the judgment
of the lower court.
Respondent, if successful herein, is entitled to a reman<
to the lower court for the awarding of attorney's fees incurr*
by respondent in prosecuting this appeal, pursuant to the provisions of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Respectfully submitted,

Pamela R. Taggar£0
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief,
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